The Advisory Committee on the Constitution offers the following advice to the 218th General Assembly (2008) regarding Item 04-08.

The overture proposes removing language in W-4.9000 identifying marriage as a relationship between “a man and a woman” in favor of language that is not gender-specific as to the parties involved. In addition, it would reverse the order of the terms by which marriage is defined so that it refers to marriage first as a “covenant” and second as “a civil contract.”

The understanding of Christian marriage is set forth in W-4.9001:

Marriage is a gift God has given to all humankind for the well-being of the entire human family. Marriage is a civil contract between a woman and a man. For Christians marriage is a covenant through which a man and a woman are called to live out together before God their lives of discipleship. In a service of Christian marriage a lifelong commitment is made by a woman and a man to each other, publicly witnessed and acknowledged by the community of faith.

This definition of marriage identifies three distinct contexts in which God’s gift of marriage is received, each of which lays a claim on the church to provide a faithful response. First, “marriage is a gift God has given to all humankind for the well-being of the entire human family.” Second, “Marriage is a civil contract between a woman and a man.” Third, “For Christians, marriage is a covenant through which a man and a woman are called to live out together before God their lives of discipleship.” These three sentences require interpretation: Does the second sentence (civil contract) describe a subset of the first (gift to all humankind), or is it a description of how the gift is conferred? Does the second sentence (civil contract) control and subsume the third (Christian marriage)?

These are questions that apply directly to the polity issues presented by the overture, and which divide the church as to its understanding of what constitutes a faithful witness to the world. If God’s gift of marriage is only conferred through a civil contract, then the church’s practice (and therefore its witness) regarding marriage would be limited by the definitions set by civil authority. While the church can always define marriage more narrowly than the state, and restrict marriage in the church by enforcing its own limits and conditions, if the gift of marriage to the church were independent of the state and not fully subsumed by the civil contract definition, then it would have a basis for performing marriages as acts of prophetic and compassionate witness against civil definitions it deemed too narrow.

The social witness policies of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) have consistently advocated for the end to discrimination in the civil arena on the basis of sexual orientation. This commitment to equality under the law has prompted our support of civil unions for homosexual couples that would afford them protections and rights by the state equal to those afforded heterosexual couples under marriage. The church has permitted the blessing of same-sex unions as an act of pastoral care to its members and as an act of witness, justice, and compassion to the wider community.

However, the church, on the basis of it historic interpretation of the standards of its faith, has drawn a distinction between same-sex unions, which it has permitted within the church, and homosexual marriage, which it has not. This distinction was affirmed in our polity by the decision of the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission in the case of Benton, et al. v. Presbytery of Hudson River, (Remedial Case 212-11, Minutes, 2000, Part I, p. 586). This decision relied on a 1991 authoritative interpretation of W-4.9001, which reads (in part):

. . .since a Christian marriage performed in accordance with the Directory for Worship can only involve a covenant between a woman and a man, it would not be proper for a minister of the Word and Sacrament to perform a same sex union ceremony that the minister determines to be the same as a marriage ceremony. (Minutes, 1991, Part I, pp. 55, 57, 395)

Benton then drew an important distinction between same-sex unions and marriages:

A determinative distinction between a permissible same-sex ceremony and a marriage ceremony is that the latter confers a new status whereas the former blesses an existing relationship. The Book of Order makes this theological distinction concerning marriage in W-4.9004: "In the name of the triune God the minister shall declare publicly that the woman and the man are now joined in marriage." This and similar pronouncements declaring a new status are to be reserved for services of marriage. (loc. cit.)

Both the Preface to the Directory for Worship and W-1.4001 make clear the connection between the church’s faith and its practice, so that forms of worship are informed biblically, theologically, and ecumenically, and the practice of worship respects both the tradition of the church and the pastoral needs of the community. In this light, changes to the language, forms, or definition of marriage should be informed by theological fidelity, ecumenical consultation, and pastoral sensitivity.

Changing civil understandings of marriage raise new questions of how pastors are to lead the church in exercising pastoral care to its members and compassionate witness and outreach to its neighbors. For example, in some civil jurisdictions, same-sex unions are automatically accorded the legal status of marriage. In others, the state will not sanction a marriage unless both parties present valid social security cards. The Baltimore overture seeks to provide greater options to pastors facing these questions.

Should the assembly consider such a definition more faithful to the service of Christ in the church, the ACC finds the language proposed in the overture to be clear and consistent with that intent. However, in light of the Preface to the Directory for Worship, the ACC believes it would be incumbent on the assembly to clarify the biblical and confessional warrant for, as well as the ecumenical impact of, any alteration to the definition of marriage in the Directory for Worship.

Were the assembly to approve and the church adopt the overture as presented, it would have the effect of negating the authoritative interpretation of 1991 and the Benton decision, as each is predicated on the constitutional definition of marriage as between “a man and a woman” exclusively. The ACC advises the assembly, however, that changing the definition of marriage in W-4.9001 would leave intact the language relating to the standards for church officers contained in G-6.0106b that calls for “fidelity in the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman,” although the accompanying citation to W-4.9001 would no longer apply.